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This study explored kindergarten students’ intuitive strategies and understandings in 
probabilities. The paper aims to provide an in depth insight into the levels of 
probability understanding across four constructs, as proposed by Jones (1997), for 
kindergarten students. Qualitative evidence from two students revealed that even 
before instruction pupils have a good capacity of predicting most and least likely 
events, of distinguishing fair probability situations from unfair ones, of comparing 
the probability of an event in two sample spaces, and of recognizing conditional 
probability events. These results contribute to the growing evidence on kindergarten 
students’ intuitive probabilistic reasoning. The potential of this study for improving 
the learning of probability, as well as suggestions for further research, are discussed. 
INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The importance of having all students develop a sound awareness of probability 
concepts and appropriately use these concepts in solving problems has been 
recognized in recent curriculum documents (e.g., National Council of Teachers of 
Mathematics, 2000). These recommendations adopt the position that young students, 
even at the kindergarten level, need to explore the processes of probability (NCTM, 
2000). The teaching of probability is, however, not an easy task (Fischbein & 
Schnarch, 1997; Langrall & Mooney, 2005). As argued by Shaughnessy (1992), 
modeling probabilistic situations is complex and the teaching of probability concepts 
is often hindered by students’ primitive intuitions and alternative conceptions. 
Following recommendations for early introduction of probability concepts in school 
curricula and for students to exhibit probabilistic thinking, there is a need for students 
to understand probability concepts that are multifaceted and develop over time 
(Jones, Langrall, Thornton, & Mogill, 1997). Although there has been substantial 
research on young children’s probabilistic thinking (e.g., Fischbein, 1975; Fischbein, 
& Schnarch, 1997; Piaget & Inhelder, 1975; Shaughnessy, 1992), little recent 
research has been done in the field of teaching and learning probabilities to young 
learners and further on how young learners’ intuitive models and strategies on 
probability concepts are incorporated into solving problems related to probability.    
Fischbein (1975) reported that ‘probability matching’, “the expression of … the 
intuition of relative frequency” (p.58), had been observed and generally well 
established in pre school children. Although the concept of ratio appears to be crucial 
to the development of probabilistic reasoning (Piaget & Inhelder, 1951) and therefore 
the concept of chance cannot be obtained before proportional reasoning is mastered 
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(Greer, 2001), the intuitive foundations of pre-school students can serve for the 
development of probabilistic knowledge. As primary intuitions of chance and the 
concept of change certainly exist in pre-school students (Greer, 2001; Langrall & 
Mooney, 2005), it is important to take these intuitions into consideration in designing 
and implementing problem-solving activities in probability. Moreover, it is generally 
agreed that even before formal instruction in probability, children already acquire an 
elementary understanding of probability and are able to compare the probability of 
two situations in a qualitative way (e.g., English, 1993; Fischbein, 1975; Fischbein & 
Gazit, 1984; Sharma, 2005).
For the purposes of the present study we used the cognitive framework proposed by 
Jones and colleagues (1997, 1999), which can be used to describe and predict 
students’ probabilistic thinking. In line with previous research, the proposed 
framework assumes that probabilistic thinking is multifaceted and develops slowly 
over time. Four key constructs are incorporated in the framework, to satisfactorily 
capture the manifold nature of probabilistic thinking and its interconnections. These 
constructs are sample space, probability of an event, probability comparisons, and 
conditional probability. Furthermore, young children’s probabilistic thinking is 
described across four levels for each of the four constructs: the subjective level, the 
transitional level, the informal quantitative level, and the numerical level (Jones et al., 
1997, 1999).
Since the present study focuses on exploring and identifying young learners’ 
probabilistic thinking, students’ actions at the subjective and transitional level are 
presented next. At the subjective level, children can list an incomplete set of 
outcomes for a one-stage experiment, predict most/least likely events partially based 
on subjective judgments, and recognize certain and impossible events. Children can 
also compare the probability of the same event in two different sample spaces, cannot 
distinguish “fair” probability situations from “unfair” ones, and recognize when 
certain and impossible events arise in a non-replacement situation (Jones et al., 1997, 
p.111). At the transitional level, the children list a complete set of outcomes for a 
one-stage experiment and sometimes list a complete set of outcomes for a two-stage 
experiment using limited and unsystematic strategies. Children can predict most/least 
likely events based on quantitative judgments (but sometimes may revert to 
subjective judgments), and make probability comparisons based on quantitative 
judgments (may not quantify correctly and may have limitations when non-
contiguous events are involved). At the transitional level children begin to distinguish 
“fair” probability situations from “unfair” ones, recognize that the probability of 
some events changes in a non-replacement situation. Recognition is, however, 
incomplete and is usually restricted only to events that have previously occurred 
(Jones et al., 1997, p.111). 
The aim of the present study was to investigate kindergarten students’ intuitive 
probabilistic strategies and understandings in solving problems related to 
probabilities. For this purpose, the framework developed by Jones and colleagues 
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(1997) was used as a basis for identifying, exploring, and providing an in depth 
analysis of kindergarten students’ thinking strategies.   
DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY 
Participants and Procedures 
Students in a large rural kindergarten school formed the population for this study. 
Four classes of the school are currently participating in a 2-year longitudinal study of 
students’ probabilistic thinking and mathematical modeling. The school population is 
representative of a broad spectrum of multicultural and socioeconomic backgrounds. 
Twelve students, six from each of the two grade levels (one grade for 3-4 year olds 
and one for 5-6 year olds) were randomly selected and served as case studies. Prior to 
the start of this study, none of the students had been exposed to probability 
instruction. Due to space limitations, the interview of one pair of students (one from 
each grade level) is presented in this paper, namely Alex, 4 years and 3 months and 
Chris, 6 years and 1 month. It should be noted that both students are ranked (by their 
teachers) among the best in their classes.
The data reported here are from the first year of the respective longitudinal study and 
are drawn from one of the problem activities the children completed during the first 
year. The Car Racing problem (see Figure 1a and 1b) is a math applet, developed in 
Scratch (http://scratch.mit.edu), a freeware visual programming software, that can 
directly run from the Web. The problem presented a spinner (see Figure 1a for initial 
colours), three cars and a number of different representations related to the car racing. 
(a)        (b)  
Figure 1: The Car Racing Activity. 
These included the position of each car, a bar chart for the three colours and a 
“pattern style” representation for the different trials. Additionally, the applet gave 
students and teacher the opportunity to recolour the spinner (see Figure 1b for an 
example).
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(Greer, 2001), the intuitive foundations of pre-school students can serve for the 
development of probabilistic knowledge. As primary intuitions of chance and the 
concept of change certainly exist in pre-school students (Greer, 2001; Langrall & 
Mooney, 2005), it is important to take these intuitions into consideration in designing 
and implementing problem-solving activities in probability. Moreover, it is generally 
agreed that even before formal instruction in probability, children already acquire an 
elementary understanding of probability and are able to compare the probability of 
two situations in a qualitative way (e.g., English, 1993; Fischbein, 1975; Fischbein & 
Gazit, 1984; Sharma, 2005).
For the purposes of the present study we used the cognitive framework proposed by 
Jones and colleagues (1997, 1999), which can be used to describe and predict 
students’ probabilistic thinking. In line with previous research, the proposed 
framework assumes that probabilistic thinking is multifaceted and develops slowly 
over time. Four key constructs are incorporated in the framework, to satisfactorily 
capture the manifold nature of probabilistic thinking and its interconnections. These 
constructs are sample space, probability of an event, probability comparisons, and 
conditional probability. Furthermore, young children’s probabilistic thinking is 
described across four levels for each of the four constructs: the subjective level, the 
transitional level, the informal quantitative level, and the numerical level (Jones et al., 
1997, 1999).
Since the present study focuses on exploring and identifying young learners’ 
probabilistic thinking, students’ actions at the subjective and transitional level are 
presented next. At the subjective level, children can list an incomplete set of 
outcomes for a one-stage experiment, predict most/least likely events partially based 
on subjective judgments, and recognize certain and impossible events. Children can 
also compare the probability of the same event in two different sample spaces, cannot 
distinguish “fair” probability situations from “unfair” ones, and recognize when 
certain and impossible events arise in a non-replacement situation (Jones et al., 1997, 
p.111). At the transitional level, the children list a complete set of outcomes for a 
one-stage experiment and sometimes list a complete set of outcomes for a two-stage 
experiment using limited and unsystematic strategies. Children can predict most/least 
likely events based on quantitative judgments (but sometimes may revert to 
subjective judgments), and make probability comparisons based on quantitative 
judgments (may not quantify correctly and may have limitations when non-
contiguous events are involved). At the transitional level children begin to distinguish 
“fair” probability situations from “unfair” ones, recognize that the probability of 
some events changes in a non-replacement situation. Recognition is, however, 
incomplete and is usually restricted only to events that have previously occurred 
(Jones et al., 1997, p.111). 
The aim of the present study was to investigate kindergarten students’ intuitive 
probabilistic strategies and understandings in solving problems related to 
probabilities. For this purpose, the framework developed by Jones and colleagues 
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(1997) was used as a basis for identifying, exploring, and providing an in depth 
analysis of kindergarten students’ thinking strategies.   
DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY 
Participants and Procedures 
Students in a large rural kindergarten school formed the population for this study. 
Four classes of the school are currently participating in a 2-year longitudinal study of 
students’ probabilistic thinking and mathematical modeling. The school population is 
representative of a broad spectrum of multicultural and socioeconomic backgrounds. 
Twelve students, six from each of the two grade levels (one grade for 3-4 year olds 
and one for 5-6 year olds) were randomly selected and served as case studies. Prior to 
the start of this study, none of the students had been exposed to probability 
instruction. Due to space limitations, the interview of one pair of students (one from 
each grade level) is presented in this paper, namely Alex, 4 years and 3 months and 
Chris, 6 years and 1 month. It should be noted that both students are ranked (by their 
teachers) among the best in their classes.
The data reported here are from the first year of the respective longitudinal study and 
are drawn from one of the problem activities the children completed during the first 
year. The Car Racing problem (see Figure 1a and 1b) is a math applet, developed in 
Scratch (http://scratch.mit.edu), a freeware visual programming software, that can 
directly run from the Web. The problem presented a spinner (see Figure 1a for initial 
colours), three cars and a number of different representations related to the car racing. 
(a)        (b)  
Figure 1: The Car Racing Activity. 
These included the position of each car, a bar chart for the three colours and a 
“pattern style” representation for the different trials. Additionally, the applet gave 
students and teacher the opportunity to recolour the spinner (see Figure 1b for an 
example).
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Data Collection and Instrumentation 
A semi-structured interview protocol based on the framework proposed by Jones and 
colleagues (1997) was administered by the authors. The interview assessment 
comprised tasks related to the Car Racing problem. The tasks were associated with 
sample space, with probability of an event, with probability comparisons, and with 
conditional probability (see selected tasks, Table 1). The tasks enabled the 
researchers to explore students’ probabilistic thinking across the two levels of the 
framework. The data sources included video-tapes of students’ responses to the 
interview questions and our own field notes. The two students worked together. Some 
questions, however, were directed to one of them, while in other questions students 
were asked to first discuss the question between them and then answer. 
Sample Space Probability of an 
Event
Probability 
Comparisons 
Conditional
Probability 
What colour will 
you get if you spin 
the spinner again 
and again? Is that 
all? How do you 
know?
Which colour has 
the least chance to 
appear? (1/2 was 
yellow, 1/3 was 
blue and 1/6 was 
green)
Colour the spinner 
in a way that you 
will have the best 
chance to win, 
using at least two 
colours.
What colour has 
the best chance of 
getting? Why? (no 
yellow in last four 
trials and all 
colours were 1/3) 
Table 1: Selected Tasks from the Interview.  
The transcripts were reviewed by the authors and data were analysed using 
interpretative techniques (Miles & Huberman, 1994) to explore and identify 
developments in students’ probabilistic thinking with respect to: (a) the four key 
constructs of the proposed framework (sample space, probability of an event, 
probability comparisons and conditional probability), and (b) the two levels of 
probabilistic thinking (subjective and transitional).  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
We report here on the students’ understanding of probability concepts in terms of the 
two levels of probabilistic thinking as reported by Jones and colleagues (1997) and 
discuss possible further enhancements of the proposed framework, based on the 
results of the study. The individual responses and discussions between the two 
students were analyzed, and summaries and exemplars were produced to illuminate a 
number of the probabilistic thinking strategies outlined in the proposed framework 
and to suggest new thinking strategies. None of the students tended to generate the 
same level of probabilistic thinking for all four constructs. We therefore decided to 
present their results are follows: First we focus on students’ probabilistic thinking 
strategies that are related to Level 1 (Subjective), and then we focus on their 
strategies that appear to be linked to Level 2 (Transitional).  
Mousoulides, English 
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Level 1 Probabilistic Thinking Strategies 
Alex, the younger child exhibited both level 1 and level 2 probability thinking 
strategies. It should be noted, however, that he did not provide correct answers for all 
questions and problem situations related to the four constructs at level 1. 
Consequently, he provided fewer correct responses to problems corresponding to 
level 2. Chris, the older child successfully answer all questions related to all four 
level 1 constructs. 
An explicit difference in the two students’ responses was the absence of any 
subjective beliefs in Chris’ judgements. He totally based his answers and comments 
on his probabilistic related intuitions and on his understandings on other 
mathematical constructs. On the contrary, Alex quite frequently based his comments 
on subjective beliefs. However, he did not consistently use subjective knowledge, but 
he rather used it when he felt that he could not use any of his prior mathematical or 
other understandings. On sample space related questions, he easily listed all possible 
outcomes when, for example, colours had equal probabilities. Sometimes, in 
questions that colour probabilities were not equal, he only listed his favourite colour 
or the colour that was more likely to happen. On a task, for example, where 5/6 of the 
spinner was shaded yellow and 1/6 blue, he reported that it was not fair because green 
was missing. He responded that only yellow would appear, since blue was too small 
compared to yellow. Somehow contradictory to what Jones (1997) reported, 
sometimes Alex spontaneously listed all expected outcomes. He could even recolor 
the spinner in a number of ways as to match a predefined list of outcomes. So, for 
example, when he was prompted to recolor the spinner in a way that only green and 
blue were the possible outcomes, he coloured 4/6 green and 2/6 blue. When asked if 
that was the only solution, he coloured one green slice into blue. His two solutions 
are presented in Figure 2.  
Figure 2:  Alex’s solutions.
A typical thinking strategy of Alex in probability comparisons, which was consistent 
in almost all his actions and responses, was his tendency to believe that the number of 
slices was more important than the size of them. When he was presented with a task 
where 1/3 was yellow, 2/6 was green and 2/6 was blue, he reported that it was not fair 
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Data Collection and Instrumentation 
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colleagues (1997) was administered by the authors. The interview assessment 
comprised tasks related to the Car Racing problem. The tasks were associated with 
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conditional probability (see selected tasks, Table 1). The tasks enabled the 
researchers to explore students’ probabilistic thinking across the two levels of the 
framework. The data sources included video-tapes of students’ responses to the 
interview questions and our own field notes. The two students worked together. Some 
questions, however, were directed to one of them, while in other questions students 
were asked to first discuss the question between them and then answer. 
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trials and all 
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Table 1: Selected Tasks from the Interview.  
The transcripts were reviewed by the authors and data were analysed using 
interpretative techniques (Miles & Huberman, 1994) to explore and identify 
developments in students’ probabilistic thinking with respect to: (a) the four key 
constructs of the proposed framework (sample space, probability of an event, 
probability comparisons and conditional probability), and (b) the two levels of 
probabilistic thinking (subjective and transitional).  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
We report here on the students’ understanding of probability concepts in terms of the 
two levels of probabilistic thinking as reported by Jones and colleagues (1997) and 
discuss possible further enhancements of the proposed framework, based on the 
results of the study. The individual responses and discussions between the two 
students were analyzed, and summaries and exemplars were produced to illuminate a 
number of the probabilistic thinking strategies outlined in the proposed framework 
and to suggest new thinking strategies. None of the students tended to generate the 
same level of probabilistic thinking for all four constructs. We therefore decided to 
present their results are follows: First we focus on students’ probabilistic thinking 
strategies that are related to Level 1 (Subjective), and then we focus on their 
strategies that appear to be linked to Level 2 (Transitional).  
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Level 1 Probabilistic Thinking Strategies 
Alex, the younger child exhibited both level 1 and level 2 probability thinking 
strategies. It should be noted, however, that he did not provide correct answers for all 
questions and problem situations related to the four constructs at level 1. 
Consequently, he provided fewer correct responses to problems corresponding to 
level 2. Chris, the older child successfully answer all questions related to all four 
level 1 constructs. 
An explicit difference in the two students’ responses was the absence of any 
subjective beliefs in Chris’ judgements. He totally based his answers and comments 
on his probabilistic related intuitions and on his understandings on other 
mathematical constructs. On the contrary, Alex quite frequently based his comments 
on subjective beliefs. However, he did not consistently use subjective knowledge, but 
he rather used it when he felt that he could not use any of his prior mathematical or 
other understandings. On sample space related questions, he easily listed all possible 
outcomes when, for example, colours had equal probabilities. Sometimes, in 
questions that colour probabilities were not equal, he only listed his favourite colour 
or the colour that was more likely to happen. On a task, for example, where 5/6 of the 
spinner was shaded yellow and 1/6 blue, he reported that it was not fair because green 
was missing. He responded that only yellow would appear, since blue was too small 
compared to yellow. Somehow contradictory to what Jones (1997) reported, 
sometimes Alex spontaneously listed all expected outcomes. He could even recolor 
the spinner in a number of ways as to match a predefined list of outcomes. So, for 
example, when he was prompted to recolor the spinner in a way that only green and 
blue were the possible outcomes, he coloured 4/6 green and 2/6 blue. When asked if 
that was the only solution, he coloured one green slice into blue. His two solutions 
are presented in Figure 2.  
Figure 2:  Alex’s solutions.
A typical thinking strategy of Alex in probability comparisons, which was consistent 
in almost all his actions and responses, was his tendency to believe that the number of 
slices was more important than the size of them. When he was presented with a task 
where 1/3 was yellow, 2/6 was green and 2/6 was blue, he reported that it was not fair 
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for yellow. He said, “Green is best because it has two slices and it is my favourite 
colour. Blue is the same …has more than yellow”.     
On conditional probability tasks, both children experienced difficulties. Our problem 
setting did not include any tasks related to item replacement (or not). Alternatively, 
we used the pattern related representation that appear on the top of the applet screen 
and that presented a history of the game results. In a task where 1/3 was yellow, 1/3 
was green and 1/3 was blue, in the first five attempts the spinner returned blue, blue, 
green, blue and green. When asked what colour had the best chance of getting, both 
students identified yellow as the best for the next spinning, since according to them 
“it has not appeared yet” and “it is time now for yellow”.
Level 2 Probabilistic Thinking Strategies 
Quite impressive, Chris, the 6-year old pupil, reported typical level 2 probabilistic 
thinking strategies, in almost all four constructs. This was impressive not only 
because of his age, but also because of the absence of any formal instruction. Chris 
consistently identified a complete set of outcomes. We do not claim here that he used 
a generative strategy, since there are not enough data to support this claim. 
Consequently, in Chris’ answers, similar to Alex’s, there was quite frequently a 
tendency to overlook outcomes, rather than consider sample space and probability in 
combination. Chris exemplified quantitative reasoning in comparing probabilities. 
Similar to what Jones (1997) reported, Chris always correctly used the “more of” the 
target colour strategy. In stark contrast to Jones’ proposed framework, Chris tended 
to recognize the effect of conditional probability of related events. When asked, for 
example, how he could increase the probability of green without using the green 
painter in a setting where 1/2 was green and 1/2 was blue, he reported that he could 
use the yellow painter to paint one or more blue slices.  
Another difference from Jones’ second level of probabilistic cognitive framework 
was the absence of any subjective reasoning in Chris’ answers. No doubt, Chris is not 
a level 3 pupil in any of the four constructs and he is probably not a level 2 pupil in 
all constructs. He tried his best to employ quantitative reasoning on all items relating 
to the probability of an event. Since his knowledge of fractions was very limited, he 
used the number of slices for each colour as the basis for his quantitative reasoning. 
When presented, for example, with a task where 4/6 was green, 1/6 was yellow and 
1/6 was blue, he reported that “the probability of green was four times bigger than the 
probability of blue”. Quite interesting, in a consecutive task where 3/6 was green, 1/6 
was yellow and 2/6 was blue, when asked to compare probabilities of the different 
colours, he replied that “probability of green was 3 times bigger than the probability 
of yellow…I can not compare green and blue…it is two times…no…I do not know”.  
CONCLUDING POINTS 
Although there has been substantial research on the probability constructs 
investigated in this study (e.g., English, 1993; Fischbein, & Schnarch, 1997; Piaget & 
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Inhelder, 1975), we claim that the present study provides some interesting insights 
into kindergarten students’ probabilistic thinking, insights that are needed to guide 
classroom instruction and assessment. Although the purpose of the study was not to 
validate the framework proposed by Jones and colleagues (1997) at the kindergarten 
level, the results of the study revealed that students at the kindergarten school and 
before any formal instruction on probabilities hold and successfully employ in 
problem solving a number of probabilistic concepts. Even at the age of four, the case 
study student’s probabilistic thinking across all four constructs appeared to be 
consistent. Further, the six-year-old student not only did not use any subjective 
knowledge in his work, but he also further realised the appropriateness of the 
quantitative reasoning in comparing probabilities and in calculating the probability of 
events, without any formal instruction on fractions. This kind of knowledge on 
students’ probabilistic thinking should enhance information available to curriculum 
designers and teachers. 
In accord with the framework of Jones and colleagues (1997, 1999), we claim that 
even at the age of four, without any formal instruction and based on their intuitive 
strategies, students start developing strategies for some of the four constructs at level 
1 of the proposed framework. Further, the results showed that the six-year-old who 
participated in the study started developing successful quantitative and qualitative 
strategies for all four constructs at both levels. Further, even problem posing was not 
part of the tasks, the older student managed to pose correct probability problems for 
the younger student in order to exemplify his thinking during their discussion on 
several interview tasks. We do not claim that this is the case for all or for the majority 
of students and we are aware that very often students, especially at this age level are 
often distracted and misled by subjective knowledge, contradictory intuitions and 
other irrelevant aspects of the problems presented to them (English, 1993; Langrall & 
Mooney, 2005). However, the results provide some evidence that probability 
concepts should be introduced to students at the kindergarten level and teaching 
needs to consider all aspects related to students’ prior intuitive strategies and 
cognitive models related to probability and number sense.    
The results of the study illuminate the framework constructs by identifying more in-
depth insights into students’ probabilistic thinking. We need to address here the 
contribution of the software applet in framing the context of the problem situation 
presented to students and in providing fundamentally new representational resources 
(Greer, 2001). Clearly substantial more research is needed to identify the extent to 
which the car race scenario, the different representations (spinner, bar-chart like 
graph, pattern style), and the active manipulation of the spinner (changing colours at 
the beginning and during an experiment) contributed in enhancing student’s 
probabilistic thinking.   
The small sample size and given that both students were high achievers may limit the 
extent to which conclusions about the probabilistic thinking strategies students hold 
at the kindergarten level can be drawn. Further studies are needed to investigate in 
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for yellow. He said, “Green is best because it has two slices and it is my favourite 
colour. Blue is the same …has more than yellow”.     
On conditional probability tasks, both children experienced difficulties. Our problem 
setting did not include any tasks related to item replacement (or not). Alternatively, 
we used the pattern related representation that appear on the top of the applet screen 
and that presented a history of the game results. In a task where 1/3 was yellow, 1/3 
was green and 1/3 was blue, in the first five attempts the spinner returned blue, blue, 
green, blue and green. When asked what colour had the best chance of getting, both 
students identified yellow as the best for the next spinning, since according to them 
“it has not appeared yet” and “it is time now for yellow”.
Level 2 Probabilistic Thinking Strategies 
Quite impressive, Chris, the 6-year old pupil, reported typical level 2 probabilistic 
thinking strategies, in almost all four constructs. This was impressive not only 
because of his age, but also because of the absence of any formal instruction. Chris 
consistently identified a complete set of outcomes. We do not claim here that he used 
a generative strategy, since there are not enough data to support this claim. 
Consequently, in Chris’ answers, similar to Alex’s, there was quite frequently a 
tendency to overlook outcomes, rather than consider sample space and probability in 
combination. Chris exemplified quantitative reasoning in comparing probabilities. 
Similar to what Jones (1997) reported, Chris always correctly used the “more of” the 
target colour strategy. In stark contrast to Jones’ proposed framework, Chris tended 
to recognize the effect of conditional probability of related events. When asked, for 
example, how he could increase the probability of green without using the green 
painter in a setting where 1/2 was green and 1/2 was blue, he reported that he could 
use the yellow painter to paint one or more blue slices.  
Another difference from Jones’ second level of probabilistic cognitive framework 
was the absence of any subjective reasoning in Chris’ answers. No doubt, Chris is not 
a level 3 pupil in any of the four constructs and he is probably not a level 2 pupil in 
all constructs. He tried his best to employ quantitative reasoning on all items relating 
to the probability of an event. Since his knowledge of fractions was very limited, he 
used the number of slices for each colour as the basis for his quantitative reasoning. 
When presented, for example, with a task where 4/6 was green, 1/6 was yellow and 
1/6 was blue, he reported that “the probability of green was four times bigger than the 
probability of blue”. Quite interesting, in a consecutive task where 3/6 was green, 1/6 
was yellow and 2/6 was blue, when asked to compare probabilities of the different 
colours, he replied that “probability of green was 3 times bigger than the probability 
of yellow…I can not compare green and blue…it is two times…no…I do not know”.  
CONCLUDING POINTS 
Although there has been substantial research on the probability constructs 
investigated in this study (e.g., English, 1993; Fischbein, & Schnarch, 1997; Piaget & 
Mousoulides, English 
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Inhelder, 1975), we claim that the present study provides some interesting insights 
into kindergarten students’ probabilistic thinking, insights that are needed to guide 
classroom instruction and assessment. Although the purpose of the study was not to 
validate the framework proposed by Jones and colleagues (1997) at the kindergarten 
level, the results of the study revealed that students at the kindergarten school and 
before any formal instruction on probabilities hold and successfully employ in 
problem solving a number of probabilistic concepts. Even at the age of four, the case 
study student’s probabilistic thinking across all four constructs appeared to be 
consistent. Further, the six-year-old student not only did not use any subjective 
knowledge in his work, but he also further realised the appropriateness of the 
quantitative reasoning in comparing probabilities and in calculating the probability of 
events, without any formal instruction on fractions. This kind of knowledge on 
students’ probabilistic thinking should enhance information available to curriculum 
designers and teachers. 
In accord with the framework of Jones and colleagues (1997, 1999), we claim that 
even at the age of four, without any formal instruction and based on their intuitive 
strategies, students start developing strategies for some of the four constructs at level 
1 of the proposed framework. Further, the results showed that the six-year-old who 
participated in the study started developing successful quantitative and qualitative 
strategies for all four constructs at both levels. Further, even problem posing was not 
part of the tasks, the older student managed to pose correct probability problems for 
the younger student in order to exemplify his thinking during their discussion on 
several interview tasks. We do not claim that this is the case for all or for the majority 
of students and we are aware that very often students, especially at this age level are 
often distracted and misled by subjective knowledge, contradictory intuitions and 
other irrelevant aspects of the problems presented to them (English, 1993; Langrall & 
Mooney, 2005). However, the results provide some evidence that probability 
concepts should be introduced to students at the kindergarten level and teaching 
needs to consider all aspects related to students’ prior intuitive strategies and 
cognitive models related to probability and number sense.    
The results of the study illuminate the framework constructs by identifying more in-
depth insights into students’ probabilistic thinking. We need to address here the 
contribution of the software applet in framing the context of the problem situation 
presented to students and in providing fundamentally new representational resources 
(Greer, 2001). Clearly substantial more research is needed to identify the extent to 
which the car race scenario, the different representations (spinner, bar-chart like 
graph, pattern style), and the active manipulation of the spinner (changing colours at 
the beginning and during an experiment) contributed in enhancing student’s 
probabilistic thinking.   
The small sample size and given that both students were high achievers may limit the 
extent to which conclusions about the probabilistic thinking strategies students hold 
at the kindergarten level can be drawn. Further studies are needed to investigate in 
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depth the probabilistic thinking of young students, covering a broad spectrum of 
multicultural and socioeconomic backgrounds. Clearly, more research is needed to 
examine the extent to which instructional programs influence the development of 
probabilistic thinking and to identify the critical steps in students’ development of 
probability concepts. Such research would result in a more pervasive description of 
students’ probabilistic thinking and could be even more useful in informing 
instruction in kindergarten and elementary school.  
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